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Abstract 
The agriculture sector in Nepal has not been growing as expected over the last decade. To 
understand the ongoing dynamics in the Nepalese agriculture sector, the study states a hypothesis 
that lack of effective and efficient financing cause slow agriculture sector growth. The 
hypothesis is tested using a system dynamics model representing the Nepalese agriculture sector 
with causalities of financing on the sector. The analysis of the hypothesis states that insufficiency 
in formal banking access causes aggregate interest rate to rise, which reduces investment and 
capital in the sector, causing production levels to fall and vice versa. The model used to test the 
hypothesis replicates the historic production trajectory in the Nepalese agriculture sector with 
only a maximum deviation of an approximate 5 percent. Based on the reliability of the model in 
terms of representing the Nepalese agriculture sector for the past 15 years, two policies are 
proposed to increase productivity. The policy propositions, expansion of formal banking market 
share and interest rate cut, to cost-effectively cover the rural agriculture sector, result in 
significant improvements on production and income levels over the next 25 years. These policies 
have significant positive implications for restructuring the growth trajectory of the Nepalese 
agriculture sector towards an optimistic outlook.    
(Note: Due to time constraint, the study doesn’t incorporate the consequences of the Nepal 
earthquake of April 25, 2015) 
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1. Introduction 
The agricultural sector in Nepal is not developing as hoped for with several likely negative consequences 
for the sector itself and for the rest of the economy. The hypothesis explored in this thesis is that lack of 
efficient financing mechanism is a major reason for the problems. To test the hypothesis a system 
dynamics model is developed. The hypothesis is not rejected and for that reason, the thesis ends with a 
discussion of policies to increase the availability of financing for the agricultural sector. 
Average growth rate in output of the agricultural sector in Nepal for the last decade is only 3.2 percent. 
The growth rates in the agriculture sector for last ten years range from 1 to 5.8 percent with extreme 
volatility in the growth rate year after year. This unsustainable growth rates suggest that the agriculture 
sector in Nepal is lacking priority. The slow productivity growth towards a potential in the agro sector 
that could be considerably higher has implications for the entire economy. According to a macroeconomic 
report published by the central bank of Nepal based on the annual data of 2013/14 AD, increase in the 
price index of fruits and vegetables were 20.5 percent and 13.7 percent respectively during the review 
period of 12 months. This is relatively high compared to the general inflation of 9.1 percent during the 
same period. The meager growth rate in the agriculture sector with such a significant contribution to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) affects overall economic growth rate in Nepal.  
In this thesis, we state a hypothesis that lack of effective and efficient financing mechanisms causes slow 
agriculture growth and increased food prices. We also hypothesize that the agriculture sector strongly 
influences economic growth rate in Nepal. As the agriculture sector in Nepal lacks sufficient government 
focus, food prices in Nepal increases significantly based on local production and supply issues. 
Inefficiency in agro financing has not only hindered farmers economically, but has also risen general food 
prices due to increasing imports to fulfill local demand of agro products. Absence of a comprehensive 
financing mechanisms results in high capital and interest costs for the agricultural sector, eventually 
affecting income generating capacity and living standards of farmers. High interest rates imply that the 
farmers are not able to accumulate much wealth. This prevents a virtuous circle where the surplus from 
one year enables investments and increased investments the next year. This cycle, in the long run, 
discourages farmers and can possibly displace many from the agriculture sector.  
At a more detailed level, the hypothesis states that the agro sector in Nepal lacks coordinated financing. 
Lack of effective financing mechanism prevents farmers to avail credit facilities with nominal interest 
rates from formal banking system. This in turn, makes loanable funds very expensive to the farmers 
combined with higher interest rates charged by informal lending in rural sector where there are no formal 
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lending authorities. As the aggregate lending rates are extremely high, the efficiency and productivity of 
the agro sector goes down with reduced investment capacity. Consequently, the growth rate in the 
agriculture sector is not realized as hoped. With unsustainability in Nepalese agriculture sector due to lack 
of effective financing support and extremely high interest rates, traders are forced to import agro products 
to fulfill the local demand. This further causes food prices to rise and triggers inflation that affects 
farmers‟ real income, real GDP and eventually economic growth rate.    
Finally, analysis of the model used in this thesis suggests that increase in access of formal banking in 
rural areas offering nominal interest rate facilitates a rapid agro sector growth. Furthermore, with lowered 
cost of production in the agro sector, food prices in general are also lowered with reduced imports of agro 
products helping Nepal to become self-reliant on agro products. In general, the policy intervention 
incorporating expansion of urban banking targeting the agro economy shows a significant growth in the 
agro sector, control in food prices and a tremendous contribution of the agro sector to GDP. 
This thesis is mainly divided into four sections starting with the review of various related literatures. The 
third section of the study focuses on a hypothesis. The hypothesis is tested using a system dynamics 
model representing the Nepalese agriculture sector and analysis of the hypothesis tests how financing 
slows growth in the Nepalese agriculture sector. The thesis continues with a discussion on policy and 
implementation structures for proposed policy interventions. This is followed by a conclusion and 
recommendation section focused on reforming the financial system in Nepal.       
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2. Literature Review 
The thesis is primarily based on a hypothesis that lack of effective and efficient financing 
mechanism causes slow agriculture sector growth. As the agriculture sector in Nepal lacks a 
structured agro financing regime to facilitate entire stakeholders involved in the sector, the sector 
is not growing as hoped for over the last decade. Furthermore, the agriculture sector, which 
contributed 33.1 percent to GDP at current prices in fiscal year 2013/14 (Economic Survey 
2014), significantly influences economic growth rate in Nepal. With the agriculture sector 
lacking sufficient growth, the country‟s economic growth rate is also affected.   
Different studies have shown interesting findings concerning agriculture sector in the past.  
According to Hatlebakk (2009), high rural interest rates seem to be a major obstacle to rural 
agriculture development in Nepal. He further emphasize that some poor farmers are in a vicious 
circle, where they every year take the same consumption loan, which is, on average, repaid with 
50% real interest rate. In his study, Hatlebakk focuses on price determination in informal rural 
credit markets in Nepal. He further emphasizes on interest rate determination mechanism in rural 
credit markets, which is purely based on social background of borrowers and loan tenures.  
Furthermore, his study suggests that the price discrimination in rural credit market is a major 
problem in the agriculture sector. The findings from Hatlebakk‟s study in Nepalese rural agro 
sector clearly suggest that farmers in the rural agriculture sector in Nepal are exploited by 
informal lending sector, which consists of individual lenders with substantial capital ownership. 
Unlike in Hatlebakk‟s research, which focuses on interest rate determination and discrimination 
in Nepal‟s rural agro sector, this thesis focuses on lack of formal financing structure in aggregate 
agriculture sector in Nepal and aims to see its impact on the agriculture sector growth and food 
prices. As an important component of financing mechanism, however, the study focuses on the 
aggregate interest rate being charged in the agriculture sector in Nepal. By focusing on 
inefficiency in interest rate structure in formal lending sector, the study also attempts to eradicate 
the informal credit in Nepalese agriculture sector by strengthening the formal credit structure. 
Furthermore, this thesis also endeavors to identify causality within interest rate, productivity in 
the agro sector and income level as a cyclical process. 
Tiffin and Irz (2005) in their study “Is agriculture the engine of growth” focus on causality 
between agricultural value added per worker and GDP per capita, where they conclude that 
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agricultural value added is a causal variable in developing countries. Their study confirms that 
agriculture is the engine of growth in developing countries. Furthermore, the study also verifies 
that agricultural productivity growth is necessary to get the economy moving as it releases 
surplus of food, labor, raw materials, capital and foreign exchange, while simultaneously 
generating demand for industrial goods and services. Similar to the analysis of Tiffin and Irz, this 
thesis also attempts to understand the impact of financing mechanism on the agricultural sector 
growth in Nepal. However, this thesis strictly focuses on the role of effective financing structure 
in formal sector on effectiveness in the agricultural sector. Here, effective financing structure 
refers to ease in availability of loanable funds or capital and justifiable interest rates in formal 
lending system. Because, if funds are not easily available at reasonable interest rates, it affects 
growth in the agriculture sector, which in turn increases food prices, creates unemployment 
problems, eventually affecting aggregate economic growth rate in the long run.  
Irz, Lin, Thirtle and Wiggins (2001) in their study “Agricultural Productivity Growth and 
Poverty Alleviation” emphasize on the role of agricultural growth in poverty alleviation. Amidst 
agricultural growth, they present arguments for job creation, linkages from farming to rest of 
rural economy, and a decline in real cost of food for whole economy. The study strongly exhibit 
consequences of agricultural growth in terms of higher incomes for farmers, increased 
employment and rise in farm wage rates, improved investment and welfare, and more tax 
revenue. Furthermore, with agricultural sector gaining momentum, demand for better 
infrastructure (roads, power supplies, communications) is generated. Consequently, the national 
economy is better-off in terms of reduced food prices, increased real wages, rise in saving, 
improved foreign exchange allowing import of capital goods and essential inputs for agriculture 
sector. Furthermore, as the agriculture sector drives entire economy in developing countries, 
other forms of industries are also better-off with the agriculture sector performing well. Irz et al. 
(2001) in their research postulate that a yield increase of one-third in agriculture sector might 
reduce the numbers in poverty by a quarter or more. Despite Irz et al. (2001) in their study 
emphasize on impact of agricultural growth in poverty alleviation, they have not focused on how 
to achieve growth in the agriculture sector. Now, from their research, it is evident that 
agricultural growth is an engine for poverty alleviation, our concern in this thesis is to achieve 
growth in the agriculture sector to improve living standard of the people in Nepal. Nepal lacks 
sufficient focus on financing mechanisms for the agriculture sector. Due to lack of formal 
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lending authorities at a nationwide level, the agriculture sector in Nepal is facing capital 
rationing issues. Furthermore, as the government of Nepal has not been able to implement 
nominal interest rate structure for the entire agriculture sector, farmers are forced to take loans at 
higher interest rates from both formal and informal sectors. This results in reduced investment, 
yield, income, saving in the agriculture sector which compromises the living standard of people 
as a whole. Thus, the study focuses on strengthening financing regime in Nepalese agriculture 
sector with strict focus on establishing formal lending institutions at a countrywide level offering 
nominal interest rates. 
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3. Analysis of Hypothesis  
In this chapter, the model used in the study is tested and explained. The model is partially 
presented and detailed with separate sections for each components of the model. While 
presenting the model, one of the most important sections, capital sector as indicated by Capital 
Mobilized, is considered at first and then the rest of the model is presented following the loops or 
sequence in the model.   
3.1. Capital Mobilized 
In the model, „Capital Mobilized‟ (CM) is a stock of the accumulated capital over time in the 
agriculture sector in Nepal. CM represents the total physical capital deployed in the agriculture 
sector and involved in production activities. Physical capital includes machineries, tools and 
equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, all kind of vehicles involved in the sector and warehouses. The 
development of CM is the result of „Investment‟ (I) and „Depreciation‟ (D). Here, I is the yearly 
investment made in the agriculture sector to acquire capital required for agricultural activities 
and D represents yearly devaluation of CM.  
 
Figure 3.1. SFD for CM with its respective flows 
(Note: Refer to Appendices section for the complete model) 
Equation 3.1.1 shows the computation of CM in the model and equation 3.1.2 is an expression 
for the initial value of CM in the base year, which stands to be NPR 200 billion.     
Capital Mobilized (t) = Capital Mobilized (t - dt) + (Investment - Depreciation) * dt    
        (Equation 3.1.1) 
INIT Capital Mobilized = 200,000,000,000                        (Equation 3.1.2)   
In the equations above, „t‟ represents time and „dt‟ represents change in time. 
7 
 
Here, CM is the function of CM over time in addition to the difference of I and D with respect to 
time. In the model, CM in the base year is estimated to be NPR 200 billion. In the absence of 
data on actual capital mobilized in the Nepalese agro sector, CM is calibrated in the model. CM 
is considered as a causal variable of production. Thus, the initial value of CM is based on the 
production function in the model.    
In figure 3.2, the simulation behavior of CM over the time period of 15 years is displayed. CM, 
which starts at NPR 200 billion in the base year, grows to NPR 393 billion by the end of 2014 
with a steady-state growth.    
In the simulation period of 15 years, CM increases by approximately 96.5 percent. With 
gradually increasing investment, the inflow of CM, the total capital deployed in the agriculture 
sector in Nepal shows a steady growth. Furthermore, despite yearly depreciation rate of 10 
percent, CM increases over time in accordance with the increasing level of investment from 
banks and retained earnings of the farmers.   
 
Figure 3.2. Simulation Behavior of CM 
3.1.1. Depreciation 
In economic terms, depreciation means decrease in value of assets. Thus, the equation presented 
in the model calculates yearly usage of CM in accordance with Depreciation Factor (DF). Here, 
DF is an average of depreciation rates, considered as an index of depreciation in the agriculture 
sector, used in Nepal in accounting purposes for various kinds of machines, tools, equipment and 
Base Run
Page 1
2000.00 2003.50 2007.00 2010.50 2014.00
Years
1: Capital Mobilized
1
1
1
1
0 
200 
NPR in Billion 
393 
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vehicles. Thus, considering the accounting practices in Nepal, an average depreciation rate of 10 
percent is considered in the model to compute yearly depreciation of CM. 
Equations 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 represent the computation of D and DF respectively in the model. 
Depreciation = Capital Mobilized*Depreciation Factor           (Equation 3.1.3) 
Depreciation Factor = 0.1               (Equation 3.1.4) 
3.1.2 Investment  
Investment refers to the sum of total financial contribution of the Nepalese banking sector and 
farmers in the agriculture sector in Nepal. Actual Borrowing Rate (ABR) is the total amount of 
financing received from the banking sector and Retained Earnings (RE) is net saving of the 
farmers in the Nepalese agriculture sector accounted after financial and household obligations. 
Both ABR and RE are explained in the following section of this chapter.   
Investment, purely determined by ABR and RE exhibits a tremendous growth during the 
simulation period. Investment which starts at approximately NPR 35 billion in the base year 
stands at approximately NPR 54 billion at the end of the simulation period, which is 2014. This 
shows that investment in the Nepalese agriculture sector grew by over 50 percent over the period 
of 15 years. Thus, increase in investment from banks and farmers‟ retention of income increases 
investment in the Nepalese agriculture sector.     
The equation for „I‟ as used in the model: 
Investment = Actual Borrowing Rate + Retained Earnings          (Equation 3.1.5) 
3.2. Production 
In the model, production (P) refers to the total output of agricultural products produced in the 
Nepalese agriculture sector. The level of CM combined with the contribution of households 
determines production. Production is calculated using the „Cobb-Douglas‟ production function. 
The „Cobb-Douglas‟ production function calculates output based on the availability of factor 
inputs, which are CM and Households (H) in the model. The equation gives the amount of output 
that can be produced using these factor inputs. Here, we also use output elasticity of CM and H 
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as represented by Capital Exponent (CE) and Household Exponent (HE) respectively in the 
model.  
In the following equation, which is used in the model to calculate P, the amount of production in 
the base year is multiplied with relative values of H and CM with their respective exponents or 
elasticity factors. 
Production = 
Base_Year_Production*((Households/Households_in_Base_Year)^Household_Exponent)*((
Capital_Mobilized/Base_Year_Capital)^Capital_Exponent)          (Equation 3.2.1) 
In the proceeding section, the components of P are explained in detail. 
3.2.1. Base Year Production (BYP) 
It represents the volume of output produced in the base year in the Nepalese agriculture sector 
which stands to be 1.5 billion kilograms of output. This figure is taken from a recent publication 
of the Government of Nepal, Finance Ministry (Economic Survey, 2014). 
The equation for BYP as used in the model; 
Base Year Production = 1,500,000,000              (Equation 3.2.2) 
3.2.2. Households 
H, as used in the model, is the number of economic units of agricultural production contributing 
in the production process by availing single or multiple workforces. The data for H is considered 
from a report published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Nepal (National 
Sample Census of Agriculture, 2013). An average growth rate for the period of 14 years is 
computed and the growth rate is applied to the number of households in the base year, i.e., 2000. 
Equation 3.2.3 generates a development of H over time, which replicates the data published by 
the Central Bureau of Statistics. Equation 3.2.3 is used to estimate the number of H even after 
2014, for policy analysis. 
Households_in_Base_Year*EXP(0.0140*(time-2000))           (Equation 3.2.3) 
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3.2.3. Households in Base Year (HBY) 
HBY is the number of households actively involved in the production process in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector in the base year. The number of H in the base year is 3.4 million households. 
For further details, refer to section 3.2.2. 
The equation for HBY as used in the model is; 
Households in Base Year = 3,400,000                    (Equation 3.2.4) 
3.2.4. Household Exponent 
HE is an output elasticity that measures the responsiveness of output, i.e., P in the model, to a 
change in the level of H used in production. The weight given to HE as an output elasticity factor 
of H is .45, i.e., 45 percent. The elasticity assigned is a proxy of the contribution and significance 
of H in the Nepalese agriculture sector. 
The equation for HE as used in the model: 
Household Exponent = 0.45                      (Equation 3.2.5) 
3.2.5. Capital Mobilized  
Refer to section 3.1. 
3.2.6. Base Year Capital (BYC) 
It is the value of total capital available in the Nepalese agriculture sector in the base year. For 
simplicity, BYC is the initial value or base year value of CM in the model which stands to be 
NPR 200 billion. For further details, refer to section 3.1. 
The equation for BYC is given as; 
Base Year Capital = 200,000,000,000                    (Equation 3.2.6) 
3.2.7 Capital Exponent  
CE is also an output elasticity that measures the responsiveness of output, i.e., P in the model, to 
a change in the level of CM used in production. The weight assigned to CE in the model is .55, 
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i.e., 55 percent. The weight is assigned based on an approximate estimate of the contribution of 
the capital sector, CM in the model, in the Nepalese agriculture sector. This implies that the 
capital sector dominates the agriculture production over household sector in Nepal.  
The equation for CE is given as; 
Capital Exponent = 0.55                                (Equation 3.2.7) 
3.2.8. Comparison of the Model Behavior and the Reference Mode 
In figure 3.3, the behavior of P given by the model is „Production‟, represented by trajectory 2, 
and the reference mode is „Production Data‟ as represented by trajectory 1. The actual data for 
production is taken from a recently published economic survey conducted by the Government of 
Nepal (Economic Survey, 2014). Both the reference mode and the model simulation have 
production levels of 1.5 billion kilograms each in the base year. With a maximum volatility of 
about approximately 5 percent from the reference behavior, the behavior generated by the model 
corresponds with the reference behavior throughout the simulation period of 15 years. The 
production level by the end of 2014 according to the model simulation is 2.3778 billion 
kilograms which is extremely close to 2.38 billion kilograms, the reference point. The level of 
accuracy given by the simulation behavior corresponding to the reference mode clearly exhibits 
the robustness of the model in explaining the reference behavior in the Nepalese agriculture 
sector.     
 
Figure 3.3. Reference mode versus Simulation Behavior of P 
Base Run
Page 1
2000.00 2003.50 2007.00 2010.50 2014.00
Years
1: Production Data 2: Production
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2 2.38 
1.5 
2.38 
1.5 
Kilograms in billion 
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3.2.9. Sensitivity of Capital Mobilized on Production 
In the model, I is the inflow to CM. The amount of CM over time changes with a change in the 
value of I. Sensitivity in I by 20 percent generates interesting production behavior over time as 
exhibited in figure 3.4. In the graph, the behavior of P as marked by „1‟ is given by the reference 
CM. Similarly, the production behavior marked as „2‟ and „3‟ are given by an increase and 
decrease in I by 20 percent respectively.  
A 20 percent increase in I which results in increased CM increases production compared to the 
neutral production level. A 20 percent increase in I increases P by approximately 11 billion 
kilograms by the end of 2014. This exhibits that an increase in I increases P.   
The sensitivity of P with a decrease in I by 20 percent is quite considerable. When I decreases by 
20 percent, the development of P over time is considerably lower than the base or reference 
scenario. As given by the simulation, a 20 percent fall in I results in an approximate 10 percent 
decrease in P by the end of the simulation period, i.e., 2014. The production level in 2014 after 
reducing I by 20 percent over time stand at 2.13 billion kilograms.    
 
Figure 3.4. Sensitivity of CM on P by changing I 
 
 
Base Run
Page 1
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Production: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
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3
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3.2.10. Sensitivity of Capital Exponent and Household Exponent on Production 
Here, CE and HE are output elasticity factors which measure the responsiveness of P to a change 
in the level of inputs, CM and H in the model. 
In the base year, as given by „Production 1‟ in the graph below, CE and HE are .55 and .45 
respectively which gives a production level of 2.38 billion kilograms in 2014. Testing the 
sensitivities of CE and LE, a CE of .60 and a HE of .40 gives a production level of 2.50 billion 
kilograms as represented by „Production 2‟ in figure 3.5. Further, when CE is reduced to .50 
from the base weight of .55, with HE of .50, the production level as given by „Production 3‟ in 
figure 3.5, decreases to 2.25 billion kilograms. 
These production levels with different output elasticity factors clearly exhibits that the 
production in the Nepalese agriculture sector is purely dominated by the capital sector. This 
explains the need of capital investment in the agriculture sector in Nepal. 
 
Figure 3.5. Sensitivity of CE and HE on P 
3.3 Price (Po) 
In the model, Po is derived by the interaction of demand and supply of agricultural products in 
the Nepalese economy. In a free market economy like Nepal, P is determined by the equilibrium 
point of supply and demand. Supply is given by the volume of production and demand is 
assumed to be constant with the supply in the study. Since, the study doesn‟t incorporate import 
Base Run
Page 1
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3
3
3
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of the agriculture products, demand is assumed to be equal to supply which is determined by the 
volume of production.  
Po in the model excludes the effects of market inefficiencies and inflation. Market inefficiencies 
refer to involvement of market intermediary, brokers and transport business owners which 
increase final prices. The presence of market inefficiency makes products expensive for 
consumers and makes product market less attractive. Furthermore, as the effect of inflation is 
excluded from the model, Po derived by the model is real prices over the simulation period.  
Equation 3.3.1 is derived using a demand function, thus, it is an inverse price function. Inverse 
price function is based on a base price, relative demand and price elasticity. As mentioned 
earlier, demand equals supply and supply is equivalent to P in the model. 
The equation for Po as used in the model; 
Price = (Base_Year_Price*(Production/Basic_Demand)^(-1/Price_Elasticity)) 
        (Equation 3.3.1) 
3.3.1. Base Year Price (BYPo) 
BYPo represents a price index for agricultural products in the base year. Generally, the 
significance of BYPo is to identify the real growth in production. When total monetary value of 
production is computed using BYPo, development in production over time is observed. This is 
not the case with nominal price as it comprises the effects of inflation or yearly price rise. In the 
model, BYPo is considered from a recently published economic survey in Nepal (Economic 
Survey, 2014). The price in the base year according to the report is NPR 100. 
The equation for BYPo in the model is; 
Base Year Price = 100                           (Equation 3.3.2) 
3.3.2. Production 
Refer to section 3.2. 
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3.3.3. Basic Demand (BD) 
In the model, as mentioned earlier, demand equals supply. The demand for 1.75 billion 
kilograms of agricultural products in the Nepalese agriculture sector in the base year is derived 
from the production level. The production level in the base year, which equals to supply, is 1.5 
billion kilograms. Equation 3.3.3 uses relative figure of households to compute yearly BD. This 
implies that, BD changes proportionately with a change in number of households in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector. Except for BD, the model assumes that demand equals supply, which is 
derived from the production level. 
The equations for BD and Base Year Demand as used in the model; 
Basic_Demand = Base Year Demand *Households/Households_in_Base_Year       
                  (Equation 3.3.3)        
Where, Base Year Demand = 1750000000                      (Equation 3.3.3a) 
3.3.4. Price Elasticity (PE) 
PE used in the model is the price elasticity of demand. It represents the responsiveness of 
demand of agricultural products in the Nepalese market to a change in price level. In the model, 
a PE of .95 is used. This implies that a change in price in agricultural products in Nepal has 
relatively small effect on demand. The Nepalese agricultural product market basically comprises 
of essential food crops. Thus, any change in price actually doesn‟t affect demand for such basic 
consumption products which includes rice, maize, lentils, potato, tomato, milk and alike.   
Following is the equation for PE as used in the model: 
Price Elasticity = 0.95               (Equation 3.3.4) 
(Note: Demand with a PE of less than 1 is inelastic and more than 1 is elastic) 
3.3.5. Sensitivity of Price with Respect to Price Elasticity  
Elasticity of price changes quantity demand in response to a change in price. In the model, as Po 
is derived using an inverse demand function, the impact of PE on demand changes the price 
level. Hence, the causality of PE is tested on Po. 
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The model runs with an assumption of a PE of .95 in the Nepalese agricultural product markets. 
„Price 1‟ in figure 3.6 reflects the base run with a PE of .95. It gives a price level of NPR 89 per 
kilo by the end of the simulation period which starts at NPR 118 per kilo in the base year. This is 
an approximate change of 25 percent in the price level. When PE is decreased to .50, which 
implies an inelastic demand, a price level of NPR 84 per kilo is achieved in 2014 with a higher 
price level of NPR 136 in the base year. This is a change of an approximate 38 percent in the 
price level during the review period. Finally, a price level of NPR 92 per kilo is given by a PE of 
1.50, representing an elastic demand condition, given by „Price 3‟ in the figure below. The base 
year price level for this elasticity is NPR 111 per kilo with a 17.11 percent change in the price 
level during the 15 year simulation period. 
This sensitivity test demonstrates that a higher PE causes demand to change rapidly over time 
making price levels more sensitive and less volatile. This implies that a lower PE factor makes 
demand less volatile and considering the fact that demand doesn‟t quickly change with a change 
in price, price levels changes frequently in the market. As demand in the Nepalese agricultural 
product market is inelastic, i.e., demand doesn‟t promptly adopt to change in the price levels, this 
experiment further strengthens the assumption for the inelastic PE factor of .95 considered in the 
model. 
 
Figure 3.6. Sensitivity of PE on Po 
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3.3.6. Causality among Production, Price and Demand 
In figure 3.7, the price level decreases and the production level increases over time as 
represented by „Price 2‟ and „Production 1‟ respectively. In the base year, when production is at 
1.50 billion kilograms, aggregate price is NPR 118 per kilogram and as the production level rises 
to 2.38 billion kilograms in 2014, the price level falls down to NPR 89 per kilogram. This 
inverse relationship between P and Po clearly exhibits that a rise in production leads to 
economies of scale and increases efficiency in production. As a result, as costs are minimized 
with increasing economies of scale, price level goes down with an increasing production level. 
Furthermore, as demand is represented by P in the model, it can be said that a decreasing price 
level causes demand to rise and vice versa.  
 
Figure 3.7. Causality between P and Po 
3.4. Income (I) 
„I‟ represents the total amount of monetary value generated in the Nepalese agriculture sector by 
summing up the entire production activities. Simply, it is the total revenue given by the entire 
Nepalese agriculture sector.  
As mentioned in earlier section, the model doesn‟t incorporate the effects of inflation on the 
price level. Hence, the price level is expressed in real terms in the model. Despite a reasonable 
growth in P, with falling real price levels amidst increasing production levels, I grows steadily 
throughout the simulation period as given by „Income 1‟ in figure 3.8. Figure 3.7 clearly explains 
the dynamics of P and Po and their combined effect on I resulting in a slowly growing real 
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income levels during the reference period. As exhibited in the figure below, the real income in 
the Nepalese agriculture which stands to be NPR 176 billion in the base year exhibits a slow 
growth throughout the simulation period of 15 years. In 2014, the real income given by the 
Nepalese agriculture sector is NPR 211 billion.   
 
Figure 3.8. Real Income Level 
The equation used to calculate I in the model is; 
Income = Production*Price                                      (Equation 3.4.1) 
(Refer to sections 3.2 and 3.3 for Production and Price respectively)  
3.5. Net Income (NI) 
NI represents total income in the Nepalese agriculture sector after adjusting or deducting all the 
incurred costs. In other words, it‟s the residual value of I after subtracting all the costs involved 
in the production process.  
As exhibited in equation 3.5.1, NI is derived after deducting interest repayments and debt 
repayments from I. The equation used to compute NI in the model is exhibited by the equation 
3.5.1. 
NI which starts at NPR 121 billion in the base year shows a meager growth during the simulation 
period. The observed growth in NI is supported by a decreasing level of interest repayment as 
aggregate interest rate slowly goes down during the reference period. However, despite 
increasing debt repayment, NI in the Nepalese agriculture doesn‟t fall in real terms.   
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Figure 3.9. Net Income 
Net Income = Income-Interest Repayment-Debt Repayment Rate          (Equation 3.5.1) 
(Refer to section 3.4 for Income and section 3.11.2 for Debt Repayment Rate)  
3.5.1. Interest Repayment (IRP) 
IRP is the total amount of interest paid to the lenders of funds. In Nepal, the major sources of 
agricultural funds are from formal and informal sector. The formal sector is represented by banks 
and the informal sector represents individual creditors, mostly in rural areas. As used in equation 
3.5.2, IRP is based on the total amount of debt as represented by „Total Debt‟ and an interest rate 
as represented by „Aggregate Interest Rate‟. Increase in IRP decreases NI and vice versa. 
Furthermore, increase in total debt increases IRP and vice versa, ceteris paribus.        
Interest Repayment = Total Debt*Aggregate Interest Rate           (Equation 3.5.2) 
(Refer to sections 3.11 and 3.13 for Total Debt and Aggregate Interest Rate respectively) 
3.6. Retained Earnings (RE) 
In the model, RE represents the residual money with the households after domestic and all other 
operational expenses. RE is calculated by deducting all domestic or daily household expenses 
from NI.  
Equation 3.6.1 is used to compute RE in the model. 
Retained Earnings = Net Income*Propensity to Save            (Equation 3.6.1) 
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3.6.1. Propensity to Save (PS) 
Propensity to save reflects the saving capacity of households after meeting all forms of expenses. 
Thus, when NI is multiplied with PS factor, we get RE. 
On average, PS in the entire Nepalese economy is approximately 10 percent (Economic Survey, 
2014). Since, the level of income in the Nepalese agriculture sector is below average income 
level, a PS factor of 5 percent is considered to compute RE in the model. 
The equation for PE as used in the model;   
Propensity to Save = 0.05                (Equation 3.6.2) 
3.7. Desired Capital (DC) 
DC refers to the amount of total capital required to support the Nepalese agriculture sector in a 
most effective and efficient way. It could be understood as the best efficient level of capital to 
support the production. However, it is always not possible to have DC due to numerous financial 
constraints. For simplicity, DC is the sum of total capital mobilized and desired level of 
investment in the Nepalese agriculture sector. 
In the Nepalese agriculture sector, DC plays a significant role. It exhibits the total amount of 
capital required to optimize production activities considering all the cost factors in the 
production process. In the model, interest rate and depreciation are used as the cost factors. 
Equation 3.7.1 exhibits the formulation used to compute DC. The equation is derived by taking a 
first order derivative of the profit function in the model. 
Desired_Capital = 
((Capital_Exponent*Production*Price)/(Aggregate_Interest_Rate+Depreciation_Factor))                
                                                                                                                                (Equation 3.7.1) 
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Figure 3.10. Desired Capital 
In figure 3.10, the behavior of DC over the simulation period is exhibited. DC, which is NPR 
318 billion in the base year grows in a steady state and reaches NPR 421 billion by the end of 
2014. As P and interest rate are the key determinants of DC, increasing level of P (refer to figure 
3.3) and falling „Aggregate Interest Rate‟ (refer to section 3.13) can be attributed for the 
increasing level of DC over time. With an increase in P, the need for DC increases to support the 
increasing level of production activities. Furthermore, as the interest rate goes down over time, 
as given by AIR in the model, the demand for capital increases as capital becomes less expensive 
with falling interest rates, ceteris paribus.  
3.7.1. Causality between Desired Capital and Aggregate Interest Rate 
AIR, as represented by „Aggregate Interest Rate 2‟ in figure 3.11, has a negative correlation with 
DC. When AIR is 20 percent in the base year, DC as exhibited by „Desired Capital 1‟, is NPR 
318 billion in the Nepalese agriculture sector. In the figure, it is clearly seen that a unit fall in 
AIR increases DC over time. In 2014, when AIR is 14 percent, DC stands to be NPR 489 billion. 
This clearly shows that there is an inverse relationship between AIR and DC. This implies that if 
AIR goes down, capital becomes cheaper and demand for capital rises, increasing DC in the 
Nepalese agriculture sector. Thus, lower the AIR, higher the DC and vice versa, ceteris paribus.  
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Figure 3.11. Effect of AIR on DC 
3.8. Desired Investment (DI) 
In the model, DI represents the total additional investment required in addition to the available 
capital, as represented by CM, in the Nepalese agriculture sector to support production 
efficiently. Principally, production can be fully functional if DI is fully financed, either by 
financial institutions or using personal funds.  
Equation 3.8.1 clearly exhibits that DI is the difference between DI and CM. DI is primarily 
given by P and AIR, whereas, CM is given by the level of I. Furthermore, as the economy 
requires some time to realize the actual level of DI required, a small time interval as represented 
by „Adjustment Interval‟ (AI) is used to show the time delay required to compute DI.  
Desired_Investment = (Desired_Capital-Capital_Mobilized)/Adjustment_Interval 
        Equation (3.8.1) 
3.8.1. Effect of Desired Capital and Capital Mobilized on Desired Investment 
In figure 3.12, it is clearly seen that DI (Desired Investment 1) decreases from NPR 113 billion 
in the base year to NPR 91 billion in 2014. This implies that with time the level of required 
investment in the Nepalese agriculture sector is decreasing. The prime cause for falling DI is 
increasingly increasing CM (Capital Mobilized 3) compared to the increase in demand for DC 
(Desired Capital 2). This means, the growth rate of CM is much higher than the growth rate of 
DC during the simulation period of 15 years. In the figure below, DC only grows by 
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approximately 54 percent, while, CM increases by 96.5 percent during the fifteen years. Thus, 
the difference in the growth rates of CM and DC, with the growth rate of CM being higher, 
results in decreasing DI in the Nepalese agriculture sector. 
 
Figure 3.12. Effect of DC and CM on DI 
3.9. Desired Borrowing (DB) 
DB stands for the total amount of credit desired from the formal and informal lending sector in 
the Nepalese agriculture sector. The level of DI and RE determines the amount of DB. Higher 
the DI, higher the DB and higher the RE, lower the DB and vice versa, ceteris paribus. This 
relationship is explained by equation 3.9.1. This implies that if the income level of household 
increases, the agriculture sector becomes more reliant on income rather than on credit, thus, 
reducing desire for borrowing.  
Figure 3.13 exhibits the behavior of DB over time in response to DI and RE as represented by 
trajectories „2‟ and „3‟ respectively. DB, as represented by line „1‟, decreases over time from 
NPR 107 billion to NPR 84 billion as a result of decreasing DI and meagerly increasing RE.    
Desired_Borrowing = Desired_Investment-Retained_Earnings           (Equation 3.9.1)  
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Figure 3.13. Effect of RE and DI on DB 
3.10. Maximum Allowable Loan (MAL) 
In the model, MAL represents the ceiling or maximum amount of credit that can be availed by 
the aggregate agriculture sector in Nepal. MAL purely relies on RE and AIR. Higher RE results 
in higher MAL and lower AIR causes MAL to rise. This implies that any increase in savings, as 
represented by RE, and fall in the aggregate interest rate in the economy, as represented by AIR, 
increases borrowing capacity of the agriculture sector. This relationship is explained by equation 
3.10.1. 
Maximum_Allowable_Loan = (Retained_Earnings/Aggregate_Interest_Rate)  
                  (Equation 3.10.1) 
Figure 3.14, clearly shows that MAL, as represented by line „1‟, increases from NPR 30 billion 
to NPR 47 billion during the simulation period with the falling interest rate. AIR represented by 
line „3‟ in the figure falls from 20 percent in the base year to 14 percent in 2014. Furthermore, 
slightly increasing RE (line „2‟) has also contributed to the increasing MAL. 
Base Run
Page 1
2000.00 2003.50 2007.00 2010.50 2014.00
Years
1: Desired Borrowing 2: Desired Inv estment 3: Retained Earnings
1
1
1 1
2
2
2 2
3 3 3 3
113 
91 
84 
107 
6.08 6.52 
NPR in billion 
25 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Effect of RE and AIR on MAL 
3.11. Total Debt (TD) 
TD stands for the total amount of outstanding credit in the formal and informal lending system. 
The formal lending sector is represented by banks and financial institutions, whereas, the 
informal lending sector comprises of individual creditors. Figure 3.15 exhibits the structure for 
TD as used in the model. 
 
Figure 3.15. SFD of TD with its Flows and respective determinants 
 
Equation 3.11.1 shows the components of TD in the model and equation 3.11.2 represents the 
initial value of TD in the Nepalese agriculture sector, which stands to be NPR 180 billion in the 
base year. As actual data for the initial value of TD is not available, the initial value is calibrated 
using other variables in the model. The components of TD are explained hereafter. 
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Total_Debt(t) = Total_Debt(t - dt) + (Actual_Borrowing_Rate - Debt_Repayment_Rate) * dt 
                 (Equation 3.11.1) 
INIT Total_Debt = 180,000,000,000            (Equation 3.11.2) 
                                 
3.11.1. Actual Borrowing Rate (ABR) 
ABR is the inflow for TD which increases its value over time. It refers to the yearly amount of 
financing received by the Nepalese agriculture sector. As exhibited by equation 3.11.3, ABR is 
the minimum of either DB or MAL (Refer to sections 3.9 and 3.10 for DB and MAL 
respectively). 
Actual_Borrowing_Rate = Min(Desired_Borrowing,Maximum_Allowable_Loan)  
                            (Equation 3.11.3) 
3.11.2. Debt Repayment Rate (DRR) 
DRR is the outflow of TD in the model. It decreases the value of TD over time. It refers to the 
yearly amount of debt settlement or repayment made by the households in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector. DRR is simply calculated by dividing TD by „Average Time‟ (AT), which 
represents the average financing period of households. As credit facilities are settled as early as 
possible in the Nepalese community, especially in the rural communities, the model assumes an 
average time period of 10 years for loan duration in the Nepalese agriculture sector. Equation 
3.11.5 exhibits AT as used in the model. 
Debt_Repayment_Rate = Total_Debt/Average_Time          (Equation 3.11.4) 
Average_Time = 10          (Equation 3.11.5) 
3.11.3. Causality of Actual Borrowing Rate and Debt Repayment Rate on Total Debt 
The accumulation or development of TD depends upon the net flow of ABR and DRR. TD 
increases if ABR is greater than DRR and vice versa. As the contribution of ABR is higher than 
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that of DRR, the growth of TD from NPR 180 billion in the base year to NPR 341 billion in 2014 
is justified. Thus, ABR and DRR are positively and negative correlated respectively with TD.   
 
 
Figure 3.16. Behavior of TD with respect to the Inflow, ABR and the Outflow, DRR 
3.12. Formal Banking Market Share (FBMS) 
FBMS represents the presence of formal banking system available for the Nepalese agriculture 
sector in a countrywide scope. The presence of formal banking sector facilitates credit 
opportunities to households at cheaper interest rates compared to informal financing. It promotes 
growth in the agriculture sector by providing financing to procure machineries, tools and 
equipment, fertilizers and other required investment in the sector. Generally, growing FBMS 
makes credit market more competitive, attractive and affordable to the agriculture sector.  
Equation 3.12.1 exhibits the mathematical derivation used to calculate FBMS in the model. 
Change in FBMS results from „Change in Market Share‟ (CMS) which causes FBMS to grow 
over time. Considering a report on „National Sample Census of Agriculture‟ (Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013), which states a 8 percent presence of the formal banking in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector in 2012, a market share of 2 percent is assumed in the model in the base year 
as exhibited by equation 3.12.2.  
Formal_Banking_Market_Share(t) = Formal_Banking_Market_Share(t - dt) + 
(Change_in_Market_Share) * dt                                   (Equation 3.12.1) 
Base Run
Page 1
2000.00 2003.50 2007.00 2010.50 2014.00
Years
1: Total Debt 2: Actual Borrowing Rate 3: Debt Repay ment Rate
1
1
1
1
2 2
2 2
3 3
3 3
180 
36 
18 
34 
341 
47 
NPR in billion 
28 
 
INIT Formal_Banking_Market_Share = 0.02           (Equation 3.12.2) 
3.12.1. Model’s Behavior and Reference Mode 
The behavior of FBMS as given by the model, as exhibited in figure 3.17, shows an increasing 
trend during the simulation period. FBMS, which stands to be only 2 percent in the base year, 
grows to 10 percent by the end of 2014. This clearly shows that banking access in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector is increasing. 
The growth rate driven by the model stands to be appropriate as the fraction of formal banking in 
the Nepalese agriculture sector, as per the national report of the Central Bureau of Statistics, is 
also 8 percent in 2012. This is exactly the same fraction as given by the model simulation in 
2012. The point of intersection of the actual data and the model simulation (8 percent) is 
highlighted in the figure below.   
 
Figure 3.17 Market Share of Formal Banking Sector  
3.12.2. Change in Market Share (CMS) 
CMS is the inflow to FBMS in the model. It changes the behavior of FBMS over time. Higher 
the CMS, higher the growth rate of FBMS and vice versa. If CMS is extremely low, it causes 
FBMS to grow at a very slow rate. The change in market share of formal banking in the 
Nepalese agriculture sector is given by „Desired Market Share‟ (DMS), FBMS and „Fiscal 
Implementation on Expansion‟ (FIE).  
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Equation 3.12.3 exhibits the derivation of CMS in the model. Higher the DMS, higher the CMS 
and lower the FBMS, higher the CMS and vice versa, ceteris paribus. .  Furthermore, longer FIE 
period decreases the rate of CMS and vice versa. 
Change_in_Market_Share = (Desired_Market_Share-
Formal_Banking_Market_Share)/Fiscal_Implementation_on_Expansion                        
(Equation 3.12.3) 
3.12.2.1. Desired Market Share (DMS) 
DMS represents the total required presence of the formal banking sector in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector. The desired market share is based on the concept of market demand for 
agricultural financing. Equation 3.12.4 explains the concept used to derive DMS in the model. 
The difference of DC and CM shows a slack in financing and the demand for financing persists 
in the agriculture sector. Thus, higher the DC, higher is DMS and as the level of CM increases in 
the sector, the requirement of financing decreases causing DMS to fall.  
Furthermore, the level of I plays a significant role in determining the level of DMS in the 
Nepalese economy. The concept of I in determining DMS is that when income increases, 
households have sufficient capital and an increase in savings. This leads to fall in demand for 
capital or financing from banking sector and vice versa. Thus, as higher I increases self-
sufficiency in the agriculture sector, it decreases the demand for financing and hence, decreases 
DMS and vice versa.   
Desired_Market_Share = (Desired_Capital-Capital_Mobilized)/Income         (Equation 3.12.4) 
3.12.2.2. Fiscal Implementation on Expansion (FIE) 
FIE in the model is presented as an aggregate indicator for the average time required for the 
formal banking expansion in a countrywide level, as considered by the government of Nepal. As 
mentioned earlier, longer FIE is considered to be unfavorable for FBMS as it slows down the 
rate of CMS. 
In equation 3.12.5, it is clearly seen that an increase in the level of CM reduces FIE. In the model 
with „Fiscal Policy Focus‟ (FPF) being a constant, as the growth rate of CM is much higher than 
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that of NI, which is presented in real terms, FIE period decreases over time. This implies that the 
time required for the banking expansion is decreasing. With every fall in FIE, the number of 
bank and financial institutions increases, increasing banking access.  
Policy_Review = (Net_Income/Capital_Mobilized)/Fiscal_Policy_Focus        (Equation 3.12.5) 
3.12.2.2.1. Fiscal Policy Focus (FPF) 
In the model, FPF is used as a representative of Nepal‟s Fiscal Policy‟s focus on expansion of 
banking access or rural banking as a percentage of total fiscal budget. The weight given to FPF 
in the model is an approximate percentage of the yearly budgets of Nepal, which stands to be 0.5 
percent. The basis for assigning this weight to FPF in the model is the level of aggregate focus 
on the „Budget Speech 2014/15‟ (Ministry of Finance, 2014), the fiscal policy of Nepal, given 
for the agriculture sector in Nepal. As the policy hasn‟t precisely allocated funds for banking 
expansion, the fraction of FPF used in the model is a representative for the policy‟s effort to 
improve the Nepalese agriculture sector. The focus for rural banking expansion dedicated to the 
agriculture sector is similar in the past. Thus, the weight, a constant during the simulation period, 
is an approximate indicator of the budget‟s appropriation dedicated to the banking access in the 
agriculture sector. Equation 3.12.6 exhibits FPF as used in the model. 
Fiscal_Policy_Focus = 0.005                                              (Equation 3.12.6) 
3.13. Aggregate Interest Rate (AIR) 
AIR is one of the most important variables in the model as we state a hypothesis that lack of 
effective financial structure, which includes interest rate, causes slow agriculture growth. AIR 
represents the average interest rate in the Nepalese agriculture sector considering both formal 
and informal financing systems. Formally regulated banking sector comes under the formal 
banking system, whereas, private lending/borrowing falls under the informal financing system. 
As the informal financing is not regulated, interest rates charged in informal transactions are 
much higher than in the formal financing system. According to a research by Hatlebakk (2009), 
households in the Nepalese agriculture sector pay up to 50 percent real interest rate to private 
creditors in the informal credit market. However, as the formal sector is regulated by the central 
bank of Nepal, Nepal Rastra Bank, interest rates are more competitive. For instance, according to 
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a meta-data (macro-economic data) published by the central bank of Nepal, aggregate real 
interest rate in Nepalese banking sector in 2000 AD was approximately 5 percent. 
3.13.1. Simulation Behavior of AIR and Banking in Nepal 
Figure 3.18 exhibits that AIR in the Nepalese agriculture sector decreases from 20 percent in the 
base year to 14 percent in 2014. The study hypothesizes that inefficiency in banking sector 
increases interest rate which slows down the growth rate in the agriculture sector. Validating the 
hypothesis, as the number of banks increase in the Nepalese banking industry, AIR goes down. 
For instance, when there were only 14 commercial banks in Nepal in the base year, i.e., 2000, 
AIR stood to be 20 percent. In 2014, with 30 commercial banks (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014); AIR 
in the Nepalese agriculture sector was approximately 14 percent. This strongly supports the 
hypothesis that increase in banking access reduces interest rates and increases productivity in the 
economy (refer to section 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.18. Behavior of AIR over time 
The derivation of AIR in the model is given by equation 3.13.1. 
Aggregate_Interest_Rate = 
Max(.02,(Actual_Interest_Rate*Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share+Informal_Sector_Int
erest_Rate*Informal_Sector_Market_Share)/(Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share+Inform
al_Sector_Market_Share))                         (Equation 3.13.1) 
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Equation 3.13.1 used to compute the value of AIR makes sure that the value never falls below 2 
percent. Since, „Max‟ condition is used; the equation takes maximum of either 2 percent or the 
value computed by the second part of the equation. Thus, a minimum interest rate of 2 percent is 
assumed to be viable for the Nepalese agriculture sector considering interests of both households 
and banking sector. However, AIR is determined by the second part of the equation.  
3.13.2. Limited Formal Sector Market Share (LFSMS) 
LFSMS refers to the share of formal banking in the Nepalese agriculture sector excluding the 
presence of informal sector. Equation 3.13.2 in the model makes sure that total market share of 
formal and informal sector, when combined, at maximum never exceeds 100 percent. 
(Refer to section 2.12 for FBMS)  
Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share = Min(Formal_Banking_Market_Share,(1-
Informal_Sector_Market_Share))                       (Equation 3.13.2) 
(Note: In the model, when the policy for formal banking market share is activated, ‘Formal 
Banking Market Share Policy’ is activated in place of ‘Formal Banking Market Share’) 
3.13.2.1. Informal Sector Market Share (ISMS) 
In the model, ISMS represents the total coverage of informal lending in the Nepalese agriculture 
sector. As explained earlier, informal lending comprises of private credits to households at 
higher interest rates. According to a national survey (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013), the 
coverage of informal lending in Nepalese agriculture sector stands to be 17 percent in 2012 AD. 
Thus, considering lack of other data sources and legitimate information on informal lending, a 
constant 17 percent is used in the model to represent ISMS in the model. Equation 3.13.3 
exhibits ISMS as used in the model. 
Informal_Sector_Market_Share = 0.17            (Equation 3.13.3) 
3.13.3. Actual Interest Rate (AIRo) 
AIRo represents the effective interest rate, based on the availability of collateral, in formal 
banking sector for the agriculture sector in Nepal. Sufficiency in collateral reduces risk to 
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banking sector, hence, decreases interest rates. AIRo is solely based on „Bank Interest Rate‟ 
(BIR) and „Collateral Adequacy‟ (CA). 
Equation 3.13.4 explains that if CA increases, AIR decreases and vice versa. 
Actual_Interest_Rate = 
bank_interest_rate/(if(Collateral_Adequacy<.5)then(.5)else(min(Collateral_Adequacy,5))) 
      (Equation 3.13.4) 
3.13.3.1. Bank Interest Rate 
In the model, BIR refers to the general real interest rate in the Nepalese banking sector. A real 
BIR of 8 percent is considered in the model based on published interest rates of various banks in 
the Nepalese banking sector.  The BIR of 8 percent in the model, which is used as a proxy, is 
based on an observation of interest rates of 219 licensed banks and financial institutions in the 
Nepalese banking sector (Nepal Rastra Bank, 2014).  
Equation 3.13.5 exhibits BIR as used in the model. 
Bank_Interest_Rate = 0.08              (Equation 3.13.5) 
(Note: The equation for BIR is ‘Bank_Interest_Rate = 
if(time>2014)and(Interest_Rate_Policy_Switch>0)then(Policy_for_Bank_Interest_Rate)else(0.
08),’ when the policy for BIR is activated in the model) 
3.13.3.2. Collateral Adequacy  
CA in the model represents the sufficiency of CM compared to TD in the Nepalese agriculture 
sector. Higher CM results in higher CA and higher TD decreases CA. It is simply the ratio of 
total capital and total debt as represented by CM and TD respectively. For banks and financial 
institution, CA plays an important role in determining interest rates. Higher CA means less risk 
and subsequently lower interest rate. Generally, CA greater than 1 is considered to be safe in 
banking as it shows that level of asset or capital is higher than level of debt or credit. 
In figure 3.19, CA is represented by trajectory „1‟ which is expressed in terms of „times.‟ Here, 
CM as represented by trajectory „2‟ increases by approximately 97 percent during the simulation 
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period, whereas, TD as represented by trajectory „3‟, increases only by an approximate 70.5 
percent. As the growth rate of CM is excessively higher than that of TD, CA increases from 1.11 
times to 1.15 times during the period of 15 years. This implies that the Nepalese agriculture 
sector has a positive net worth. Increasing CA, with decreasing default risks, is also one of the 
prime reasons behind gradually falling interest rates in the Nepalese agriculture sector. 
 
Figure 3.19. Causality of CM and TD on CA 
Equation 3.13.6 exhibits the computation of CA in the model. 
Collateral_Adequacy = (Capital_Mobilized/Total_Debt)          (Equation 3.13.6) 
3.13.4. Informal Sector Interest Rate (ISIR) 
ISIS refers to prevailing real interest rates in the informal financing system in the Nepalese 
agriculture sector. Interest rates charged by private creditors are extremely high, sometimes, up 
to a real interest rate of 50 percent. However, in the model, a real interest rate of 22 percent is 
assumed in the base year. The base for assuming this rate is gradually decreasing interest rate in 
the formal banking sector. ISIS is always higher that interest rate in the formal banking system, 
however, the correlation of these rates is always positive. This implies, if interest rates in formal 
banking fall, ISIS also decreases and vice versa. Figure 3.20 exhibits the trend of ISIR, as 
represented by line „1‟. With gradually falling AIR (refer to section 3.13.4), ISIR gradually falls 
from 22 percent in the base year to 18 percent by the end of 2014.    
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Figure 3.20. Interest Rate in Informal Sector 
Equation 3.13.7 exhibits the derivation for ISIR and equation 3.13.8 is an expression for the 
initial value of ISIR (base year value) as used in the model. 
Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate(t) = Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate(t - dt) + 
(Interest_Rate_Adjustment) * dt                       (Equation 3.13.7) 
INIT Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate = 0.22           (Equation 3.13.8) 
3.13.4.1. Interest Rate Adjustment (IRA)  
IRA is the multi-flow to ISIR which either increases or decreases the value of ISIR in the model. 
IRA is positive if AIR is greater than ISIR and hence increases the value of ISIR and vice versa. 
IRA represents an adjustment to interest rates in the informal financing sector. Once interest 
rates in the formal banking sector starts to fall, interest rates in the informal financing sector also 
decreases with some time delay. Equation 3.13.9 exhibits the derivation of IRA in the model. 
Interest_Rate_Adjustment = (Aggregate_Interest_Rate-
Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate)/Adjustment_Period          (Equation 3.13.9) 
3.13.4.2. Adjustment Period (AP) 
AP represents time lag for the effect of AIR to be seen on IRIS. The time delay is represented by 
equation 3.13.10. A time delay of 10 years is considered in the model. Generally, it takes a long 
time to show the effect of a fall in interest rates in the formal banking sector on the informal 
financing sector. The realization period for a fall in interest rate in the formal banking sector on 
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the informal banking sector is extremely high in Nepal. Thus, 10 years is considered to be a 
reasonable time period to show the effect of AIR on ISIR. 
Adjustment_Period = 10           (Equation 3.13.10) 
3.14. Model Behavior and Comparison with the Reference Mode 
In figure 3.21, „Simulation 1‟ (S1) represents the model‟s behavior over the simulation period of 
15 years. In the model, S1 refers to total contribution of the Nepalese agriculture sector to GDP 
of Nepal. It is named as „Contribution of the Agriculture sector to GDP‟ in the model. On the 
other hand, „Data 2‟ (D2) in the figure below exhibits the real figures of contribution of the 
agriculture sector to GDP.    
As exhibited in the figure, both S1 and D2 are NPR 150 billion in the base year. By the end of 
2014, both S1 and D2 stand to be NPR 238 billion. Throughout the simulation period of 15 
years, only a maximum deviation of approximate 5 percent is observed between S1 and D2. The 
behavior of S1 exhibits the accuracy of the model in terms of replicating the actual data points of 
contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP in Nepal. 
 
 
Figure 3.21. Model Simulation versus Reference Behavior 
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3.15. Goodness of the Hypothesis (Model) 
In the study, we state a hypothesis that lack of effective and efficient financing structure causes 
slow agriculture growth. Upon testing the model, both partially and at an aggregate level, the 
causality of financing system, as represented by FBMS and AIR, is extremely sensitive on P 
(also represented by S1 in figure 3.21, real contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP). Based 
on various sensitivity tests, the reliability and accuracy of the model is believed to be extremely 
high. The model simulation, with only a maximum deviation of approximate 5 percent compared 
to the reference mode (D1), exhibits that the model represents the stated hypothesis. Hence, the 
model is believed to have passed „The Goodness of Fit‟ test.   
3.16. Appropriateness of the Model for Policy Testing 
The model, in combination of multiple calibration, real data points and some assumptions, 
successfully replicates the reference behavior of the Nepalese agriculture sector (refer to section 
3.14). With a confidence interval of an approximate 95 percent, the model exhibits tremendous 
strength in terms of replicating the historic behavior in the Nepalese agriculture sector in terms 
of production. Furthermore, based on various sensitivity tests, the robustness of the model is 
proven. It implies that the model generates realistic picture of the Nepalese agriculture sector and 
associated financing system. Considering the goodness of the hypothesis, i.e., fit of the 
simulation behavior with the reference mode, the model is considered an appropriate platform for 
policy tests.  
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4. Policy Design and Implementation 
The government of Nepal has been focusing to promote formal banking in the rural areas of 
Nepal to foster the agriculture sector. Various provisions, concerning rural banking for the 
agriculture sector, are set in monetary and fiscal policies. Despite the government‟s attempt to 
grow the agriculture sector in Nepal, the realized progress over the last decade has not been 
satisfactory. The central bank of Nepal, Nepal Rastra Bank, requires banks to open at least two 
branches or operating units outside the capital city, Kathmandu, before they can operate a new 
branch unit in the capital. This provision, however, supports the government‟s goal to achieve a 
prosperous and sustainable agriculture sector; the progress has not been satisfactory so far.   
4.1. Policy Propositions  
The study states a hypothesis that lack of effective and efficient financing mechanism, 
incorporating high interest rates, results in slow agriculture growth. The analysis of this 
hypothesis in the preceding chapter of this study validates the stated hypothesis. In line with the 
significance of formal banking access and interest rates for overall well-being of the agriculture 
sector in Nepal, the policies focus on banking sector expansion and adjustment of market interest 
rates.  
4.1.1. Policy A-Expansion of Formal Banking Market Share 
With current focus of the government of Nepal on expansion of formal banking, the access of 
formal banking to the rural population is not satisfactory. In 2014, approximately 10 percent of 
households/farmers had access to the formal banking sector in Nepal. This clearly shows that the 
Nepalese agriculture sector immediately requires a radical shift in expansion of the formal 
banking sector. The policy option on formal banking expansion is proposed taking into account 
the insufficiency of banking access to the rural areas in Nepal.  
Equation 4.1 exhibits the equation for Policy A, Expansion of Formal Banking Market Share as 
used in the model: 
Policy_for_Formal_Banking_Market_Share = 0.4               (Equation 4.1) 
     
39 
 
 
Figure 4.1. A Structural Representation of Policy A, Formal Banking Market Share and Policy B, Bank Interest 
Rate, in the Model 
(Note: In figure 4.1, variables marked as red are policy variables and switches) 
As used in the model, „Policy for Formal Banking Market Share‟ is a policy option that accounts 
the market share of formal banking sector as 40 percent. It implies that after 2014 the share of 
formal banking sector is 40 percent in the Nepalese agriculture sector. This is simply a scenario 
test policy which gives ground for further policies. This radical shift of FBMS to 40 percent is 
tested to evaluate the pure effects of rural banking expansion on the agriculture sector in Nepal. 
This test identifies the importance of formal banking sector and creates awareness among the 
related stakeholders in the Nepalese agriculture sector. Based on the results of this test, the 
stakeholders of the Nepalese agriculture sector, like the Government of Nepal, 
farmers/households and banks and financial institutions, can take corrective actions towards 
strengthening the access of formal banking sector.   
Figure 4.2 exhibits the effect of policy of increasing the share of FMBS to 40 percent after 2014. 
By increasing FMBS, as represented by „Policy Run 2‟, the contribution of the agriculture sector 
rises to NPR 422 billion from the base scenario of NPR 412 billion, as represented by „Base Run 
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1‟, by the end of 2040. Rise in the market share of formal banking attracts households, as 
aggregate interest rates in the formal banking sector become relatively lower. This increases 
financing and investment opportunities in the agriculture sector, eventually, increasing capital 
and production. This increase in contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP of Nepal shows 
that expansion of formal banking in rural areas increases productivity in the agriculture sector. 
Furthermore, with the increase in rural banking, beyond rise in the aggregate production level, 
the Nepalese agriculture sector enjoys increased income, saving, efficiency in production and 
shared knowledge in the sector. All these factors further strengthen the productivity, which are 
not incorporated in the model. 
 
Figure 4.2. Contribution of Agriculture Sector to GDP 
4.1.2. Policy B-Reducing Bank Interest Rate 
From the analysis of the stated hypothesis in the model, it is evident that interest rate has huge 
impact on the agriculture sector productivity in Nepal. Higher the BIR, lower the production and 
vice versa. Higher interest rates discourage households to avail financing as they lack repayment 
capacities. In Nepal, an aggregate nominal interest rate of 18 percent, as used in the model, is 
considered extremely high compared to interest rates in the developed world. Households 
availing financing facilities, however, are obliged to pay higher interest rates. This lowers their 
real output and reduces efficiency in the agriculture sector.  Considering the sensitivity of BIR on 
the agriculture sector in Nepal, the second policy proposition in the study is to lower BIR by 300 
basis points to 5 percent real interest rate (refer to section 3.13.4.1 for BIR).  
Equation 4.2 exhibits the equation for Policy B, Bank Rate, as used in the model. 
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Policy_for_Bank_Interest_Rate = 0.05                            (Equation 4.2) 
In figure 4.3, as represented by „Base Run 1‟, the contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP is 
NPR 412 billion by the end of 2040. This implies that if no policies are exercised, the 
contribution of the Nepalese agriculture sector to GDP would be NPR 412 billion in 2040. The 
analysis in the study supports the hypothesis that lower interest rate increases production in the 
agriculture sector and vice versa. Hence, by exercising the policy of lowering BIR to 5 percent, 
the productivity in the Nepalese agriculture sector increases by approximately 8 percent 
compared to the situation where no policy is exercised. The contribution of the agriculture sector, 
by the end of 2040, rises to NPR 444 billion by lowering BIR by 300 basis points as exhibited by 
trajectory 2 in figure 4.3. Hence, reducing BIR to 5 percent from existing 8 percent level results 
in a satisfactory trajectory of the Nepalese agriculture sector.  
 
Figure 4.3. Sensitivity of BIR on Contribution of Agriculture Sector to GDP 
4.2. Simultaneous Sensitivity Tests of Policy A and Policy B on Production 
Figure 4.4 exhibits the effects of policies on the behavior of contribution of the agriculture sector 
to GDP (refer to section 3.14). The figure is divided in four sub-sections, A, B, C and D. The 
trajectory in figure A represents the development of the Nepalese agriculture sector when no 
policy is exercised. The contribution of the Nepalese agriculture sector for this condition is NPR 
412 billion by the end of 2040. As discussed in section 4.1.1, figure B exhibits the influence of 
Policy A. Similarly, as discussed in section 4.1.2, figure C shows the effect of Policy B on the 
Nepalese agriculture sector productivity from 2015 to 2040. Finally, figure D summarizes the 
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effects of both the policies, Policy A and Policy B, which significantly increases the contribution 
of the agriculture sector to GDP of Nepal. With the combined policy, the output in the 
agriculture sector by the end 2040 is NPR 458 billion. This is an approximate 11.5 percent rise in 
the productivity in the Nepalese agriculture sector compared to the situation when no policy is 
exercised.  
By exercising policy A, the access of formal banking significantly surges to the rural agriculture 
sector. This gradually reduces interest rates and makes financing viable for households. With 
adequate and cost-efficient financing, the productivity of the agriculture sector rises. Similarly, 
by exercising Policy B, as aggregate BIR goes down, the repayment capacity of the agriculture 
sector increases. This substantially increases borrowing capacity of the farming sector. Increased 
borrowing increases investment, which increases capital, as represented by CM in the study. As a 
result, with increased capital, production level grows increasing output in the agriculture sector. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Sensitivities of Policies on Contribution of the Nepalese Agriculture Sector to GDP 
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The proposed policies have positive impact on the agriculture sector in Nepal. These policies 
help to grow the agriculture sector and enhance the aggregate agriculture eco-system in Nepal. 
The study, however, only focuses on output in the agriculture sector, increase in agricultural 
efficiency, productivity, and technological advancement are other factors which realizes 
improvements with an improved and cost efficient financing access.   
4.3. Implementation  
The government of Nepal uses fiscal and monetary policies to address macro-level policy 
requirements. The policies are proposed taking into account the compatibility of the proposed 
policies with fiscal and monetary policy tools. Policy A, which focuses on increasing access of 
formal banking to the rural agriculture sector to 40 percent, is addressed by fiscal policy. 
Similarly, the interest rate policy, which emphasizes on lowering BIR or aggregate interest rate 
to 5 percent real interest rate, is addressed by monetary policy. 
The analysis of the stated hypothesis in the study suggests that lack of financing access and 
higher interest rates cause slow agriculture sector growth rate. Based on the positive results of 
the policy propositions as discussed in section 4.1, the government of Nepal and the central bank 
of Nepal need to consider the policies. The results of the policy tests clearly exhibit the 
causalities of formal banking share and interest rate in the Nepalese agriculture sector. As a 
higher share of formal banking access and lower interest rate cause the agriculture sector to grow 
and vice versa, as justified by the policy tests, this facilitates a clearer understanding of the 
importance of rural banking and subsidized interest rate for the agriculture sector growth. 
4.3.1. Required Actions for a Successful Implementation of the Policy Propositions 
The success of every policy strictly relies on how the policy is implemented. To implement every 
policy, an implementation guideline is vital. Hence, the study proposes the following action 
plans for a successful implementation of the policy propositions. 
 The government of Nepal should set a target to increase the formal banking sector access 
for the agriculture sector to 40 percent from the next issue of fiscal policy 
 The policy should not only state the target but also strictly highlight the procedure of 
achieving this target 
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 All the regulated financial institutions in the Nepalese banking sector should be guided to 
increase their access to rural agro sector and increase their portfolios in the agriculture 
sector to at least 15 percent of their respective total portfolio 
 The government of Nepal should focus on increasing access of banking in the agriculture 
eco-system, including storage and transportation 
 The Ministry of Agriculture should focus on facilitating educational campaigns in the 
agriculture sector, assure better product markets and eliminate involvement of market 
intermediaries 
 The next monetary policy, Monetary Policy 2072/73 (2015/16), and policies thereafter, 
should strictly prohibit banks and financial institutions to charge interest rates higher than 
5 percent real interest rate in the agriculture sector, gradually reducing the rates in the 
following years 
 
4.4. Policy Propositions and Implementation Issues Discussed 
The policies proposed in the study are considered taking into account the causalities of formal 
banking market share and interest rates on production. In the model, interest rate and market 
share of formal banking are independent variables, whereas, production and contribution of the 
agriculture sector to GDP are dependent variables. Besides, the hypothesis in the study states that 
lack of effective and efficient financing mechanisms combined with higher interest rates cause 
slow agriculture growth rate. Since the hypothesis is verified or stated to be true in the analysis 
section of the study, the policies are proposed to best fit the agriculture sector in Nepal. 
Furthermore, the tested policies generate impressive results; successful implementation of these 
policies, which also depends on following implementation actions (section 4.3.1), would 
significantly increase productivity in the Nepalese agriculture sector.   
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5. Conclusions 
Nepal, an economy based on agriculture, has been realizing a slow agriculture sector growth for 
over a decade. With the agriculture sector not gaining momentum, the overall economy of Nepal 
faces several negative economic consequences. The study states a hypothesis that lack of 
effective and efficient financing mechanism, including higher interest rates, cause slow 
agriculture sector growth. The analysis of the hypothesis strongly supports and validates the 
hypothesis. The study reveals that Nepal lacks sufficient banking access to the rural agriculture 
sector. This causes aggregate interest rates to rise, as informal sector exploit farmers by charging 
higher interest rates, resulting in reduced investment and production in the sector. Thus, the 
analysis of the study concludes that higher the banking access, lower the interest rate and higher 
the productivity and vice versa. 
The conducted study is believed to be first of its kind in the Nepalese agriculture sector where 
banking access and interest rates are directly associated to the outcome of the agriculture sector. 
The study gives interesting new insights in the Nepalese agriculture sector. Increase in banking 
access to the rural agriculture sector pulls down interest rates in the formal banking sector, as a 
result of increased competition, which gradually adjusts interest rates in the informal sector. This 
causes aggregate interest rate to fall. As aggregate interest rate falls, the volume of capital in the 
agriculture sector increases, meeting the desired investment, which contributes to production. 
This increases income, saving and investment, generating a multiplier effect in the economy. 
Furthermore, the study also exhibits that increase in the volume of mobilized capital in the 
economy puts a downward pressure on interest rates, causing rates to gradually decline over 
time. Thus, with an increasing level of production, backed by lower interest rates, cost per unit of 
output also gradually decreases over time with increase in production efficiency.  
Considering the slow agriculture growth rate in the Nepalese agriculture sector and the positive 
outcome of the policy propositions as tested in Chapter 4, the government of Nepal is 
recommended to adopt a public-private partnership model for banking expansion. The 
recommended model for banking expansion would collaborate efforts of the government of 
Nepal and banking sector in enhancing formal sector banking access to the rural agriculture 
sector. Furthermore, as lowering bank rate has a tremendous positive impact on productivity, an 
immediate rate cut (lowering bank rate) is also recommended.  
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Finally, since the study is precisely focused on causalities of interest rates and formal banking 
share on the Nepalese agriculture sector, a further research comprising qualitative effects of 
interest rates and banking access is suggested. Variables like knowledge sharing via increased 
banking access, effect of technology transfers and involvement of market intermediaries could be 
further considered in future researches.  
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Appendices 
Equations used for the study in the ‘i-think’ Model (Financing and Agriculture) 
Capital_Mobilized(t) = Capital_Mobilized(t - dt) + (Investment - Depreciation) * dt 
INIT Capital_Mobilized = 200000000000 
INFLOWS: 
Investment = (Actual_Borrowing_Rate+Retained_Earnings) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Depreciation = Capital_Mobilized*Depreciation_Factor 
Formal_Banking_Market_Share(t) = Formal_Banking_Market_Share(t - dt) + 
(Change_in_Market_Share) * dt 
INIT Formal_Banking_Market_Share = 0.02 
INFLOWS: 
Change_in_Market_Share = (Desired_Market_Share-
Formal_Banking_Market_Share)/Fiscal_Implementation_on_Expansion 
Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate(t) = Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate(t - dt) + 
(Interest_Rate_Adjustment) * dt 
INIT Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate = 0.22 
INFLOWS: 
Interest_Rate_Adjustment = (Aggregate_Interest_Rate-
Informal_Sector_Interest_Rate)/Adjustment_Period 
Total_Debt(t) = Total_Debt(t - dt) + (Actual_Borrowing_Rate - Debt_Repayment_Rate) * dt 
INIT Total_Debt = 180000000000 
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INFLOWS: 
Actual_Borrowing_Rate = Min(Desired_Borrowing,Maximum_Allowable_Loan) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Debt_Repayment_Rate = Total_Debt/Average_Time 
Actual_Interest_Rate = 
bank_interest_rate/(if(Collateral_Adequacy<.5)then(.5)else(min(Collateral_Adequacy,5))) 
Adjustment_Interval = 1.05 
Adjustment_Period = 10 
Aggregate_Interest_Rate = 
max(.02,(Actual_Interest_Rate*Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share+Informal_Sector_Interes
t_Rate*Informal_Sector_Market_Share)/(Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share+Informal_Sect
or_Market_Share)) 
Average_Time = 10 
Bank_Interest_Rate = 
if(time>2014)and(Interest_Rate_Policy_Switch>0)then(Policy_for_Bank_Interest_Rate)else(0.0
8) 
Base_Year_Capital = 200000000000 
Base_Year_Demand = 1750000000 
Base_Year_Price = 100 
Base_Year_Production = 1500000000 
Basic_Demand = Base_Year_Demand*Households/Households_in_Base_Year 
Billion = 1000000000 
Capital_Exponent = 0.55 
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Collateral_Adequacy = (Capital_Mobilized/Total_Debt) 
Contribution_of_the_Agriculture_Sector_to_GDP = Production*Base_Year_Price 
Data = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 150), (2001, 155), (2002, 160), (2003, 165), (2004, 174), (2005, 180), (2006, 183), (2007, 
185), (2008, 195), (2009, 202), (2010, 205), (2011, 215), (2012, 225), (2013, 227), (2014, 238) 
Depreciation_Factor = 0.1 
Desired_Borrowing = Desired_Investment-Retained_Earnings 
Desired_Capital = 
((Capital_Exponent*Production*Price)/(Aggregate_Interest_Rate+Depreciation_Factor)) 
Desired_Investment = (Desired_Capital-Capital_Mobilized)/Adjustment_Interval 
Desired_Market_Share = (Desired_Capital-Capital_Mobilized)/Income 
Fiscal_Implementation_on_Expansion = (net_income/Capital_Mobilized)/Fiscal_Policy_Focus 
Fiscal_Policy_Focus = 0.005 
Formal_Banking_Market_Share_Policy = 
if(time>2014)and(Formal_Banking_Policy_Switch>0)then(Policy_for_Formal_Banking_Market
_Share)else(Formal_Banking_Market_Share) 
Households = Households_in_Base_Year*EXP(0.0140*(time-2000)) 
Households_in_Base_Year = 3400000 
Household_Exponent = 0.45 
Income = Production*Price 
Informal_Sector_Market_Share = 0.17 
Interest_Repayment = Total_Debt*Aggregate_Interest_Rate 
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Limited_Formal_Sector_Market_Share = min(Formal_Banking_Market_Share_Policy,(1-
Informal_Sector_Market_Share)) 
Maximum_Allowable_Loan = (Retained_Earnings/Aggregate_Interest_Rate) 
Net_Income = income-Interest_Repayment-Debt_Repayment_Rate 
Price = (Base_Year_Price*(Production/Basic_Demand)^(-1/Price_Elasticity)) 
Price_Elasticity = 0.95 
Production = 
Base_Year_Production*((Households/Households_in_Base_Year)^Household_Exponent)*((Cap
ital_Mobilized/Base_Year_Capital)^Capital_Exponent) 
Production_Data = Data*10000000 
Propensity_to_Save = 0.05 
Retained_Earnings = net_income*Propensity_to_Save 
Simulation = Contribution_of_the_Agriculture_Sector_to_GDP/Billion 
Equations given for policy propositions in the model 
Interest_Rate_Policy_Switch = 0/1 
Policy_for_Bank_Interest_Rate = 0.05 
Formal_Banking_Policy_Switch = 0/1 
Policy_for_Formal_Banking_Market_Share = 0.4 
Nepali calendar and Gregorian calendar Conversion 
2014/15 AD approximately corresponds 2071/72 BS 
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The model, ‘Financing and Agriculture.itmx’, developed for the study using ‘i-think’  
 
